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The Brookings Institution
Introduction
T
wenty-two percent of low-income American families—over 8.4 million families earn-
ing under $25,000 per year—do not have either a checking or savings account. Most
of these “unbanked” families are low-income: 83 percent earn under $25,000 per
year. A broader population of low- to middle-income families have bank accounts but
still rely on high-cost non-bank providers to conduct much of their financial business—a pop-
ulation referred to here as the “underbanked.” This brief first explains the consequences of
inadequate access to banking services. Next, it explores key barriers to banking the poor as
well as nascent efforts to overcome these barriers. Third, it analyzes changes in the electronic
payment systems that hold out promise for banking the poor at lower cost and risk than in a
checking account paradigm. The brief concludes by proposing fundamental reforms in finan-
cial services for the poor. 
Financial Transactions Among the Unbanked and Underbanked
The Alternative Financial Sector
In lieu of bank-based transaction, saving, and credit products, the unbanked and other low-
income households often rely on the more costly alternative financial sector (AFS). AFS
providers offer a wide range of services, including short-term loans, check cashing, bill pay-
Low-income households in the United States often lack access to bank accounts and face
high costs for conducting basic financial transactions through check cashers and other alter-
native financial service providers. These families find it more difficult to save and plan
financially for the future. Living paycheck to paycheck leaves them vulnerable to medical or
job emergencies that may endanger their financial stability, and lack of longer-term savings
undermines their ability to improve skills, purchase a home, or send their children to college.
High-cost financial services and inadequate access to bank accounts may undermine widely-
shared societal goals of reducing poverty, moving families from welfare to work, and
rewarding work through incentives such as the Earned Income Tax Credit. This paper calls
for the transformation of financial services for the poor. Better access to financial services is
critical for low-income persons seeking to enter the economic mainstream.
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ment, tax preparation and rent-to-own products, most often in low-income urban neighbor-
hoods. These AFS providers are currently the only means available for many low-income
persons to access basic financial services. Follows are brief descriptions of three important 
AFS industries.
1. Check Cashers
For many years, check cashers have been used by low-income individuals to cash checks, pay
bills and wire funds. John Caskey referred to these customers as employing the “cash and carry”
method of financial management.2 Upon receiving a paycheck, they cash the check and pay
their bills immediately. While check cashers offer essential services, the fees involved in con-
verting paper checks into cash are high, relative to income, and relative to analogous
transactions middle and upper-income families use—depositing a check into a bank account, or
electronic direct deposit. 
Check cashing fees vary widely across the country and between types of checks, but typically
range from 1.5 percent to 3.5 percent of face value. The industry reports that it processes 180
million checks totaling $55 billion annually, generating $1.5 billion in fees.3 Almost all of these
checks are low-risk payroll (80 percent) or government benefit (16 percent) checks.4 While even
payroll checks are not without some credit and fraud risk, average losses from “bad” checks at
check cashing firms are low. For example, Ace Cash Express (ACE) reports that 0.5 percent of
the face value of checks bounce, but net losses after collection are 0.2 percent.5 By comparison,
0.64 percent of the face value of interbank checks were returned in 2000.6
2. Payday Lending
Payday lenders provide short-term (usually two-week) consumer loans to low- and moderate-
income working people who have bank accounts but lack credit cards, have poor credit history,
or are tapped out on credit limits. Payday loans carry high implicit annual interest rates, with an
average APR of over 470 percent. At an average loan size of about $300, the average fee just for
a single, two-week loan is about $54.7
Many borrowers, moreover, take out payday loans repeatedly throughout the year, often
because they cannot repay their earlier payday loan by their next payday. The typical payday
loan customer takes out anywhere from seven to eleven loans per year, with added fees for each
loan renewal or “rollover”. These borrowers can get caught in a “debt trap,” with payday lending
fees eating up a significant portion of their income.
Payday lenders annually make over 65 million loans totaling over $10 billion to 8-10 million
households, earning revenue of over $2 billion in the process. 
3. Tax Preparers and Refund Anticipation Lenders
The federal earned income tax credit (EITC) is a wage subsidy provided to families who earn
under about $35,000. The average family with children receiving the EITC earned a credit of
about $2,000 in 2002. Unfortunately, low-income families, particularly those with low levels of
education, or who do not speak English as their first language, may have difficulty understand-
ing the tax filing process. In addition, households face conflicting and complex rules under
different tax provisions for determining household status and dependents. Moreover, low-
income families may worry about increased IRS audits of EITC claimants and IRS delays in
issuing EITC refunds. As a result, about two-thirds of EITC claimants use commercial tax
preparation firms. In addition to seeking help with return preparation and filing, many EITC
recipients also use refund anticipation loans (RALs) and related products facilitated by tax pre-
parers. The RAL is repaid when the IRS issues the borrower’s expected refund. 
Tax preparation services and refund loans can consume a nontrivial portion of an EITC
recipient’s refund. The purchase of a RAL for an anticipated $1,500 refund costs roughly $90.
For EITC recipients filing electronically and choosing to take out a RAL, total fees would con-
sume an average of 13 percent of the EITC or nearly 8 percent of the total refund from the
EITC and other credits—totaling $1.75 billion in fees for low-income households. In addition,
for the estimated 22 percent of EITC recipients who lack a bank account, or four million
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households, the additional fee to cash a $1,500 RAL check issued by the bank partner of the
tax preparer would be at least $30 on average at a check casher, despite the low risk of the gov-
ernment checks.8
There are three main reasons why low-income households use RALs: First, banked cus-
tomers receive cash proceeds from their loans 8 to 10 days sooner than with direct deposit.
Second, RALs permit taxpayers without bank accounts to obtain their refunds without waiting
approximately four to six weeks for a paper check from the IRS. Taxpayers often use RALs to
pay off late or mounting bills faster. Third, taxpayers who do not have the funds to pay for tax
preparation services up front, find RALs and similar products necessary simply to pay preparers
to file for their refund. Tax preparation fees are deducted from the proceeds of the RAL. Thus,
the desire to have returns professionally prepared itself drives some decisions to take out RALs
independent of a desire to obtain a quicker refund. 
The Costs of Being Unbanked
The high costs of alternative financial services raise several concerns. First, the costs of these
basic financial transactions reduce take-home pay. A worker earning $12,000 a year would pay
approximately $250 annually just to cash payroll checks at a check-cashing outlet, in addition
to fees for money orders, wire transfers, bill payments, and other common transactions.9 High-
cost financial services also reduce the effectiveness of federal income transfer programs such as
the EITC and may undermine public initiatives to move families from welfare to work. 
Given the high cost of converting income from checks into cash in the alternative financial
sector, promoting bank account ownership for the poor is probably more efficient than coming
up with a program to transfer the income necessary to compensate unbanked individuals for
the cost of converting their payments to cash. The value of a government check is reduced by
the cost of converting it to cash. In addition, one unit of in-kind assistance, in the form of 
sufficient governmental incentives to induce a bank to offer a bank account to a low-income
person, would provide the benefit of liquidity to all subsequent income transfers. Moreover,
the government would save money by transferring EITC funds electronically, rather than by
paper check. 
Second, without a bank account, low-income households face key barriers to increased sav-
ing. Promoting low-income household savings is critical to lowering reliance on high-cost,
short-term credit, lowering risk of financial dislocation resulting from job loss or injury, and
improving prospects for longer-term asset building through homeownership, skills development,
and education.
Third, without a bank account, it is more difficult and more costly to establish credit or qual-
ify for a loan. A bank account is a significant factor—more so, in fact, than household net
worth, income, or education level—in predicting whether an individual also holds mortgage
loans, automobile loans, and certificates of deposit.10
Fourth, low-income families who cash their paycheck may face high risk of robbery or theft.
By transitioning into bank accounts where they can store a portion of their earnings, withdraw
funds in smaller amounts, pay for goods or services directly using debit, and withdraw funds
outside of the concentrated time periods during which benefit checks and paychecks are com-
monly cashed, these families can decrease their exposure to risk of crime.
Fifth, inefficiencies in the payments system, for example, from over- reliance on paper
checks, impose costs on the national economy. Increasing the efficiency in the payments system
for the poor could have modest positive effects on the economy as a whole. Because of positive
network externalities, funds spent converting the poor to electronic payment might speed con-
version to electronic payments more generally. 
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The Banking Sector
A. Barriers to Banking the Poor
While the banking system works extraordinarily well for most Americans, many low- and moder-
ate-income individuals face five key barriers to account ownership.
First, regular checking accounts may not make economic sense for many low-income fami-
lies. Consumers who cannot meet account balance minimums for an account at a bank often
pay high monthly fees. In addition, nearly all banks levy high charges—averaging over $20 per
item—for bounced checks or overdrafts that low-income families with little or no savings face a
high risk of paying and can ill-afford. Moreover, banks hold checks that are not “on us” for a
matter of days before depositing funds, unlike check cashing outlets; for low-income customers,
the few days wait may not be practical. The structure of these accounts is a key driver in keep-
ing the unbanked out of the banking system. 
Banks doubt that accounts tailored to low-income individuals will be profitable. While a
financial institution’s monthly costs for administering the account can likely be covered by low
monthly fees, at this early stage in the evolution of research and development for low-income
products, banks’ up front costs are likely to exceed what most unbanked households are willing
to pay. Financial institutions may need incentives to pursue research and development on
accounts for low-income customers, particularly for accounts based on electronic payments
technology. 
A second barrier comes from difficulties that many unbanked persons may have in qualifying
for conventional bank accounts because of past problems with the banking system. The
CheckSystem, a private clearinghouse that most banks use to decide whether to open accounts
for potential customers, records that nearly 7 million individuals have had their accounts closed
for prior problems, such as writing checks with insufficient funds or failing to pay overdraft
fees. While some individuals undoubtedly pose undue risk for account ownership, many poten-
tial customers could responsibly use electronic, no-overdraft bank accounts. 
Third, while many urban communities contain adequate numbers of banks, in some low-
income neighborhoods, banks, thrifts, and credit unions are not as readily accessible to
potential customers as such institutions are in higher-income areas.11
Fourth, for some low-income households, lack of financial education with respect to account
ownership, budgeting, saving, and credit management is a significant barrier to personal finan-
cial stability. The need for financial education may be particularly acute among immigrants and
other groups unfamiliar with American banking practices. The benefits of financial education
are not likely to be fully captured by any one financial institution because an educated con-
sumer will shop for financial services among competing providers. Thus, education at any scale
will likely be under-funded without public or philanthropic subsidy. 
Lastly, immigrant communities may face difficulties regarding proper documentation for
opening an account, either because they lack such documentation, or they fear that deposito-
ries will police immigration laws. While consular identification cards may now be used by
banks, at their discretion, for checking accounts, an IRS-issued individual taxpayer identifica-
tion number or a social security card is needed for interest-bearing accounts. Moreover, the IRS
will no longer guarantee that taxpayer information will not be shared with the Immigration and
Naturalization Service.
Governmental Policy and Private Sector Innovation
Despite these barriers, the 1990s witnessed a period of strong economic growth and technologi-
cal innovation that improved the prospects for banking the poor. During the latter part of the
1990s, governmental policy began to focus on expanding access to financial services for low-
income persons, focused initially on recipients of federal benefits and later on low-income
persons more generally. In addition, financial institutions began to experiment more recently
with products designed to help Hispanic and other consumers to send remittances to family
members in other countries in competition with wire transfer services. Community develop-
ment financial institutions have also experimented with new products to reach the unbanked. 
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1. Electronic Transfer Accounts
Under the Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996, the United States Treasury launched an
effort, known as Electronic Funds Transfer (EFT) ‘99, to increase direct deposit of federal ben-
efits and wages. For unbanked federal benefit recipients, Treasury designed an Electronic
Transfer Account (ETA), a low-cost, electronically based bank account. The ETA carries a maxi-
mum fee of $3.00 per month and has no minimum balance. ETAs can be used for direct
deposit of Social Security and certain other federal benefits. Under the program, Treasury pro-
vides financial institutions offering ETAs with a one-time payment of $12.60 per account to
offset the costs of opening the accounts. Despite the relatively low reimbursement amount, as
of May 2004, nearly 500 banks, thrifts, and credit unions were offering ETAs at almost 18,000
locations nationwide with a total of 98,000 accounts opened.12
The ETA project revealed that banks are likely to need subsidies to cover the cost of initiating
a program but could profitably offer electronically based accounts on a monthly recurring basis.
Treasury analysis suggests that an all-electronic ETA account with a $3.00 monthly fee would
produce pre-tax profit of $0.93 per month. Average account set up costs of $12.60 would thus
take about one year to recover. In addition, Treasury estimated that ETA products could cost
between $64,000 and $148,000 in research and product development for each financial institu-
tion. Even if a financial institution were to open 10,000 ETAs, product development would still
cost between $6 and $15 per account. Moreover, marketing and consumer education expenses
are likely also to be high, about $9-11 per account, as are the costs of training bank personnel
about the product. 
2. Electronic Benefits Transfer
The 1996 Welfare Reform law mandated that states convert from paying federal welfare bene-
fits in the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program by check to making such
payments electronically. State electronic benefit transfer (EBT) programs now cover not only
welfare payments, but a host of other state programs as well, such as food stamps and state
cash benefits.13
Unfortunately, the way EBT has been set up in most states has minimized the extent to
which electronic transfer could be utilized as an entry point to banking. Most states do not seek
to establish bank accounts for benefit recipients, but instead use a contractor to provide debit
cards to recipients to access funds held by the state government in a pooled account. Doing this
allows states to have the benefit of the “float” on benefit funds before recipients withdraw the
funds. In addition, most states hope to minimize administrative costs by having a single prime
contractor deliver EBT services rather than seeking out all depositories in the state to offer
EBT. States benefit in the short term, but this card-based approach has left most benefit recipi-
ents without access to a bank account.
3. First Accounts
At the end of the Clinton Administration, Treasury began a small pilot initiative, called First
Accounts, to expand access to main stream financial services. The First Accounts initiative had
four main components. First, Treasury would help to offset the costs financial institutions
incurred in offering low-cost, electronic banking accounts to low-income individuals. Second,
Treasury would help to defray the costs of expanding access to ATMs, POS, Internet, or other
distribution points in low-income neighborhoods. Third, Treasury would support financial edu-
cation for low-income households. Fourth, Treasury would fund research into the financial
services needs of low-income individuals and development of financial products designed to
meet these needs. 
In 2001, the new Administration awarded $8.35 million to fifteen projects seeking to bring
over 35,000 individuals into the banking system. Strategies, cost structures, other funding
sources, the extent to which capital outlays were included, and the intensiveness of financial
education offered varied significantly across chosen programs. Given the small amount of fund-
ing available and the large number of organizations funded, Treasury will have difficulty
determining from this pilot phase whether a given strategy is sustainable at scale. A more
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focused effort in a handful of metropolitan areas might have led to adoption of new technolo-
gies by major firms, and more useful data. Moreover, the Bush administration has not sought
any new funds for First Accounts and this year asked Congress to rescind some appropriated
funds. Yet only a sustained commitment would provide financial institutions with sufficient
incentive to make the necessary investments in research, technology, training, marketing, and
education to serve low-income households. 
4. Private Sector Innovation in Banking Products
Partly in response to increased information about the unbanked and incentives created by EFT
‘99, EBT, and First Accounts, a number of banks, thrifts, and credit unions have begun to
experiment with products designed to serve the needs of low-income individuals. These efforts,
though small in scale, suggest that the policies advocated here could plausibly be undertaken in
the real world.
Banco Popular has made great strides in reaching the 50 percent of Puerto Rican residents
who are unbanked. Banco Popular’s Acceso Popular account has a $1 monthly fee, no minimum
balance, free ATM transactions, and free bill payment. Acceso Popular has a savings “pocket”
into which small sums (initially, $5 per month) are automatically transferred from the Acceso
Popular transaction account. Banco Popular opened nearly 60,000 such accounts in 2001. Half
of the account holders activated the savings “pocket” in their accounts. 
ShoreBank worked with a local voluntary income tax assistance (VITA) organization to pro-
vide free tax preparation services to low-income filers in ShoreBank’s branches. EITC recipients
filing through VITA offices do not face high tax preparation and filing fees, nor do they have an
incentive to take out expensive refund anticipation loans to pay for tax preparation services.
Moreover, ShoreBank offered low-income households the opportunity to open a bank account
in order to save their refunds. 
Fleet has also launched a debit product to move unbanked employees from payroll checks to
bank accounts. The accounts carry no minimum balances, no monthly fees, permit no check
writing and allow free ATM withdrawal from Fleet’s ATMs, as well as free POS withdrawal.
Some employers are using payroll cards instead of checks to cut down on costs.
5. Remittances and the Hispanic Market
Remittances from the U.S. to Latin America and the Caribbean totaled $32 billion in 2002. Yet
more than 40 percent of Hispanic immigrants lack a bank account, and most Latino immigrants
send remittances back to their country of origin using wire transfer services, rather than
banks.14 The G-8 nations in their June 2004 summit meeting called for a greater focus on remit-
tances as a development tool, and highlighted the need to reduce the costs of sending
remittances.
New ATM-based remittance products from Citibank, Wells Fargo, Bank of America, and oth-
ers are beginning to bring more Hispanics into the banking system and are lowering the cost of
remittances. Enhanced competition from the banking sector has already helped to cut the cost
of sending a remittance to Mexico in half. Still, bank penetration of the remittance market
stands below 5 percent.15 An impediment to greater competition in this market may be a lack of
sufficient ATM and point of sale (POS) infrastructure to compete with Western Union’s strong
penetration in recipient countries, although networks appear to be widely available in many
parts of Mexico. More marketing and consumer education in the United States may also be
essential to inducing consumers to switch from wire transfer to bank products.
Progress on remittances is important for four reasons: First, given the high costs of sending
remittances, ATM-based products can help to drive down transaction costs for millions of immi-
grants. Second, bank remittance products have the potential to bring more immigrants in the
U.S. into the banking system. Given the costs of setting up each remittance transaction as a
stand-alone proposition, bank costs could be reduced by establishing a bank account for these
customers. In turn, account ownership would let immigrants convert income into cash, save,
and pay bills—not simply send remittances. Third, strategies to reduce the costs of remittances
have the potential to increase the flow of funds for development into Latin America. Lastly, new
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electronically based approaches developed for remittances may be adapted in ways that will
help to open up the banking system to the unbanked more generally.
Payments Systems and Distribution Networks
P
ayment and distribution systems significantly affect the cost and risk of providing
financial services to low-income households. This part explores changes in the use of
checks and debit cards, the expansion of ATM networks, and the potential for direct
deposit and direct payment.
Despite the potential of online debit, the widespread availability of ATMs, the increased pen-
etration of direct deposit, and the emergence of direct bill payment, the expansion of these
technologies to low-income communities may be slower than is socially optimal. At least in part,
that is because payments systems are characterized by positive network externalities. Private
suppliers of network services often lack sufficient incentives to invest in socially optimal net-
work services because they cannot capture the full public value of the network. Because public
benefits to all users of the payment system exceed private ones to each participant the socially
optimal mode of payment may not be adopted or may be adopted slowly. 
Checks and Debit Cards
Because payments systems produce network externalities, they often rely on a sponsoring entity
to subsidize entry and set uniform rules and prices for network participants. The Federal
Reserve Board sponsored and subsidized the check clearance process, beginning at the turn of
the last century, helping to establish a nationwide means for transferring funds and ensuring
the dominance for decades of check payments. Although they remain the dominant form of
retail payment, checks declined from 85 percent of non-cash payments in 1979 to 59 percent in
2001.16
Checks are costly to process, pose the risk of being overdrafted at high cost to consumers and
financial institutions, and cause delay in the availability of funds. While checks continue to
dominate, online debit cards—because they are low cost and low risk—hold out the most prom-
ise for expanding bank services to low-income households. Bank accounts with online debit
access, but no checking, would provide a low-cost, low-risk bank account for low-income
households. Yet online debit cards have themselves not been adopted as rapidly as would be
socially optimal because of the dominance of checks and off-line debit cards. 
Online debit cards can be used at an ATM, or at retail merchants with point of sale (POS)
personal identification number (PIN) pads for purchases or to obtain cash back. Sales made
with online debit generally cannot result in an overdraft, as funds transfer instantly through
EFT networks. Most banks do not charge their bank customers for using an online debit card at
POS. Moreover, many retailers permit customers to get cash back using their online debit
cards; these transactions are surcharge-free, cost the merchant no more than a standard online
debit transaction, and reduce merchant cash-handling costs. Because the transfer into their
account is instantaneous, merchants lose no interest income from float and, unlike a credit
card, the customer cannot revoke the transaction.
By contrast, offline debit cards can be used for purchases where Visa or MasterCard are
accepted by signing a receipt, do not allow cash back, are routed through Visa and MasterCard
networks, and settle in one to three days. Offline debit presents a risk that the consumer will
overdraft and requires the merchant to float the cost of sale for days. Offline debit fees paid by
the merchant to the card issuer are significantly higher than for online debit. In sum, offline
debit is higher cost and higher risk than its online counterpart.
Despite the advantages of online debit, offline debit makes up two-thirds of debit transaction
volume in the United States.17 Moreover, less than one-third of merchants have online debit
capacity.18 Offline debit is dominant in the United States, even though other advanced countries
generally utilize the more efficient online debit.
One important reason why offline debit dominates in the United States is that online debit
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has had to compete with Visa and Mastercard’s entrenched credit card infrastructure, which
they use to offer offline debit. As debit grew in importance in the 1990’s, Visa and MasterCard
implemented “honor-all-cards” rules that required merchants who accepted Visa and Master-
Card credit cards also to accept their debit cards. In addition, Visa and MasterCard imposed a
“one price” policy that prohibited merchants from charging a differential fee to customers for
using the more costly, offline debit. Lastly, the firms made their debit and credit cards physically
indistinguishable. Because the higher interchange fees for offline debit could not be passed on
to customers, they were indifferent to the form of payment, and the use of offline debit
increased at an inefficient rate.19
The honor-all-cards rules and the prohibition of surcharging offline debit usage can largely
be understood as an effort by Visa and MasterCard to “sponsor” offline debit to extend their
market power. The prohibition on surcharges prevented retailers from forcing consumers to
internalize the cost of their offline debit usage, thereby dampening consumer demand for POS
terminals. The honor-all-cards rules, which effectively tied offline debit acceptance to credit
card acceptance, effectively blocked retailers, whose customers demanded the availability of
credit card usage, from refusing to accept offline debit. By maintaining a large base of retailers
who accept the offline payment format, the incentive for a consumer to demand online debit
was maintained at a low level. Visa and MasterCard essentially sought to postpone “tipping” to
the more efficient online standard for as long as possible. 
Under network externality theory, setting network fees within a network for the same product
is generally thought of as important to establishing a network. But letting one network set
prices in another network can be anti-competitive and lead to sub-optimal outcomes. 
The tension came to a head with the antitrust suit led by Wal-Mart against Visa and Master-
Card. The parties ultimately settled on the eve of trial. Visa and Mastercard agreed to eliminate
the honor-all-card rules and to pay significant damages.20
The settlement has the potential to benefit the poor. The separation of credit and offline
debit is likely to result in lower interchange fees for offline debit as Visa and MasterCard seek
to preserve their market share, and faster growth of its online counterpart as merchants seek
cost savings. This, in turn, would lower the cost and risk of providing bank accounts to low-
income households using online debit card access. 
ATMs
Transactions at ATMs are significantly less expensive than transactions with tellers, and the
costs of ATMs are significantly lower than the costs of a bank branch. ATMs thus offer an
opportunity to deliver financial services to the poor at lower cost than “bricks and mortar”
branches. With the advent of surcharging, rapid expansion of ATM deployment in the late
1990s has dramatically increased the availability of ATMs to 324,000 nationwide. That growth
is unlikely to continue as the market matures, but widespread ATM networks present possible
distribution channels for expanded access to banking services for the poor. Given the economics
of ATM placement and operation, which require high volumes of fee-driven transactions, a
strategy for expanding access to banking for the poor using ATMs or POS will likely require 
governmental incentives to be viable in some low-income areas with low penetration of these
technologies. Moreover, further expansion of ATMs is contingent on surcharge income, but 
surcharging significantly increases the cost of using ATMs for low-income persons.21
Bank accounts and ATMs are complementary products that exhibit indirect network external-
ities: Increasing the penetration of bank accounts will increase the number of ATM users,
giving banks a greater incentive to deploy more ATMs. Although ATM dispersal is quite broad
now, and network effects from additional users are likely to be low, additional account holders
from low-income communities with low ATM penetration would increase incentives to place
ATMs in those locations. Moreover, where there is intense competition among ATM deployers,
surcharging is more difficult to maintain because non-customers are more likely to be relatively
close to an ATM owned by their own bank. Thus, surcharging is less prevalent in areas with
higher ATM densities. Pointedly, ATM densities are lower and surcharging more prevalent in
areas with higher concentrations of ethnic or racial minorities, and of elderly persons.22
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To avoid costly surcharging, low-income persons would need to establish bank accounts with
banks that have high penetration of ATMs in communities near where they live or work. The
need to use a bank with a strong local ATM presence would complicate efforts to bank the
unbanked on a national scale. More importantly, the goal of avoiding surcharging conflicts with
the goal of expanding deployment. ATMs require significant surcharge income to support them-
selves. The additional security costs associated with deployment of ATMs in high-crime areas
would also complicate efforts to serve the poor. 
In addition to the basic functions of income deposit and withdrawal, ATMs could be used to
provide a broader range of services, such as check cashing, issuing money orders, wiring funds,
stamp vending, automatic bill payment, and replenishing prepaid cell phones. These advanced
functions could help position ATMs as competitors to both banks and check cashers in provid-
ing financial services to low- and moderate-income customers. Now that Congress has enacted
the Check Clearing for Twenty First Century Act, banks could deploy ATMs with check trunca-
tion technology permitting them to capture check information electronically. These ATMs could
process checks without the need for daily physical transfers of checks, which would dramati-
cally reduce the cost of providing deposit-taking or check cashing capacity at off-premises
machines. 
In sum, the rapid growth in deployment of ATMs presents a real opportunity for the delivery
of financial services to low- and moderate-income consumers. ATMs are far less expensive than
bank branches and teller time, although the tension between surcharging and reducing costs for
the poor may complicate efforts to expand access to bank services through ATMs. ATMs could
potentially be used to make deposits of income, convert income to cash, and pay bills electroni-
cally or through disbursement of money orders. These three functions are critical financial
services for the poor. Yet while advanced functions could one day prove useful to low-income
ATM users, current practice suggests that day is a long way off. 
Direct Deposit and Bill Payment
Advances in the automated clearing house (ACH) system can make it easier and cheaper to
offer banking products, such as direct deposit and bill payment, which are carried on the ACH
network. Direct deposit and bill payment could reduce reliance on more expensive comparable
transactions conducted by low- and moderate-income households, such as cashing payroll
checks and buying money orders. ACH already carries nearly $6 trillion in retail electronic pay-
ments. Expanding ACH and lowering its price would make electronically based bank accounts
more attractive to and useful for low- and moderate-income households.
In contrast to issuing and cashing checks, direct deposit is lower cost to employers, employ-
ees, and banks. Direct deposit permits employees to get immediate access to their funds.
Low-income persons who have access to direct deposit need not wait for a check to clear or visit
a check casher. Direct deposit involves no risk of bounced, lost, or stolen checks. Banks that
currently issue payroll checks for employers and switch to direct deposit services may see
reduced lines at tellers on paydays as employees no longer wait to cash their employer’s check
“on us” at the issuing bank. Payroll cards are designed for just that purpose, and are an impor-
tant step toward banking. Moreover, direct deposit can facilitate saving.
Direct deposit is already used by more than 100 million individuals in the U.S. and is offered
by more than 80 percent of firms with more than 100 employees. Yet many low-income workers
do not have access to direct deposit, in part because many of them do not have bank accounts.
Low-income persons are more likely to work in smaller firms, which tend not to offer direct
deposit, and to have sporadic, part-time, or multiple employment, which complicate direct
deposit. The challenge is to bring direct deposit to more workplaces employing low-income
workers and to more low-wage workers—including part-time or temporary workers—wherever
they work. 
Similarly, electronic bill payment could be more widely used by low-income consumers—at
lower cost and risk than checks or money orders. Direct bill payment eliminates the risk of late
payment fees and interest charges, charges for checks, and postage expense. Direct payment is
advantageous for the billing company as well, as it reduces the risk of non-payment and late
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payment. Moreover, consumers using direct payments tend to maintain higher balances in their
bank accounts and save more than consumers who do not use it.23 Direct bill payment may also
increase one’s ability to establish a credit history because, unlike payment of bills with cash or
money orders, the bank processing a direct payment regularly captures information about it. 
For most banked middle- and upper-income customers, however, checks remain cheap and
convenient, and bill payment may appear uncertain, effectively delaying deployment of the nec-
essary infrastructure to reduce costs and increase availability of electronic payments. Moreover,
businesses must overcome high initial costs and customer inertia. Furthermore, businesses may
be reluctant to expand direct bill payment for low-income customers since such customers are
more likely not to have a bank account through which to pay bills, and low-income customers
are less likely to open a bank account if they cannot use the account to pay their bills directly.
Thus, the indirect network externality may hinder expansion of direct bill payment. In addition,
low-income persons may have a heightened need to control the timing of their bill payment—
delaying payment on the phone bill to pay the rent, for example—given their low levels of
liquidity. Thus, direct bill payment may make sense for only some low-income persons, or for
only critical monthly bills, with discretion retained as to the timing in paying others. 
More widespread use of direct deposit and electronic bill payment would reduce the need for
low-income people to frequent high-cost alternative financial service providers to cash checks
or pay bills, and would lower payment systems costs more broadly. Given these positive external-
ities from adoption of ACH, ACH may be priced higher than is socially optimal by the Federal
Reserve Board, which handles 80% of ACH transactions. Although ACH prices have been
declining, ACH services are still priced too high relative to check services.24
Transforming Financial Services for the Poor
T
his brief proposes a cohesive strategy to increase bank account ownership among low-
and moderate-income households: First, and most importantly, Congress should enact
a “First Accounts Tax Credit” to financial institutions to develop and deploy electroni-
cally-based banking products for low-income households. Second, the federal banking
regulators should use the Community Reinvestment Act to shed light on bank and thrift per-
formance in meeting the financial services needs of low-income households. Third, states
should shift their EBT programs to bring TANF recipients into the banking system. Fourth,
Congress and Treasury should support financial education to help to change the financial serv-
ices and savings behavior of low- and moderate-income households as part of an initiative to
provide new financial services for the unbanked. Lastly, federal and state governments should
take a series of smaller steps to help reform the AFS sector.
A New First Accounts Tax Credit
To transform the market for low-income financial services, I propose a tax incentive for finan-
cial institutions to offer low-cost electronic accounts for low-income persons.25 Financial
institutions could receive a tax credit equal to a fixed amount per account opened. Roughly
speaking, the amount of the credit would be calculated to cover the average administrative cost
to an average bank of offering the account, taking into consideration research and product
development, account opening and closing costs, marketing and financial education, and the
training of bank personnel. Using Treasury’s analysis conducted for ETAs would suggest that
the tax credit be set at an amount between $20 and $50 per account opened. 
Banks, thrifts, and credit unions could, under the First Accounts Tax Credit, experiment with
a wide variety of techniques to expand access to the unbanked and to provide an increasing
range of services to the underbanked.26 Banks could obviate concerns about individuals in the
Chex system, or those with credit problems, by working with the private clearinghouses to bet-
ter distinguish among types of past problems, by offering accounts contingent on completion of
financial counseling, and by offering electronically based accounts that pose little risk of over-
draft. Banks may experiment with accounts with savings features, including separate savings
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“buckets” within accounts. Similarly, banks could provide low-income individuals with a con-
venient and low-cost means of paying bills and wiring funds. Automated money orders, online
bill payment, debit-card-based foreign country remittance, and other low-cost payment methods
can help to reduce the cost of transactional services to the poor. Treasury estimated that adding
a savings feature to an electronic account would cost approximately $0.06 per month. Adding
ACH bill payment would cost $0.65 per month. Accepting direct deposits would decrease net
costs by $0.11 per month because of added float income.27
In addition, the First Accounts Tax Credit has the potential to help spur “leapfrogging” in
technology for low-income financial services. To offer a few examples that could be subjected to
the test of market feasibility: ATM networks and financial institutions could develop shared
technological platforms to serve low-income households, reducing research and development
costs for each firm, or even create “surcharge free alliances” among debit networks in order to
serve low-income customers. As access to the Internet expands in low-income communities
through efforts to bridge the “digital divide,” e-finance can increasingly be made available to the
poor at Internet or other kiosks. Companies that are exploring ways to expand the use of cellu-
lar phones to transact financial services for high-income clientele could be encouraged to focus
attention on expanding bank account access through pre-paid cellular phones commonly used
by low-income persons. Smart cards could be used by unbanked customers to conduct an
increasing array of bank-like transactions at relatively low cost.
A First Accounts Tax Credit could also help to spur employer or union strategies to expand
access to banking services. Banks using the tax credit could market new, low-cost banking serv-
ices to employers for the firm’s employees. Employer-driven strategies to bank the unbanked
have three potential strengths: large-scale, consistent access to workers, a structure for provid-
ing regular savings through direct deposit, and the ability to offer financial education. Large
employers can reap significant benefits from moving more of their workers to direct deposit.
Direct deposit would drive down their payroll processing costs, increase the effective take-home
pay of their workers, and reduce problems from theft or fraud associated with checks. 
Payroll cards might serve as useful starting points towards an increasing range of financial
services—including bill payment, savings, and bank accounts—for low-income persons.
Employers are increasingly moving towards the provision of electronically based payroll serv-
ices. In one model, employees are given a smart card. Banked employees can direct deposit
funds from their smart cards to their personal accounts; unbanked employees can simply with-
draw funds through an ATM or POS. Employers could work with banks utilizing a First
Accounts tax credit to make available all-electronic bank accounts through which they could
use their payroll cards.
Critics of this proposal might argue, why another tax credit? Substantively, the tax credit pro-
posal could be criticized in two ways: as a supply-side, rather than a demand-side subsidy, and
as an in-kind mechanism, rather than a direct cash transfer. 
The relative efficiencies of demand compared with supply programs depend on the elasticity
of supply in the sector. The supply of low-cost electronic bank accounts is likely to be charac-
terized by a single fixed cost for start-up and low marginal costs for additional accounts. Thus,
after the provision of the tax credit, supply is likely to be highly elastic. If supply is perfectly
elastic, there is no welfare difference in a supply-side subsidy or a demand voucher. 
Moreover, the danger is quite small that subsidies for low-cost banking accounts would pro-
vide a windfall to banks that would offer such accounts without the tax credit. It is difficult to
know the extent of this problem without more empirical evidence. There are some small-scale
private sector initiatives in serving low-income customers, partly motivated by market forces
and partly by governmental and philanthropic programs. Given that network externalities may
slow the adoption of technologies that would better serve the poor, the tax credits are less
likely to result in windfalls rather than to permit market participants to internalize network
externalities. 
Importantly, this supply-side subsidy is more likely to induce a change in the nature of finan-
cial services offered to low-income consumers at lower cost than demand-side subsidies. If
low-income consumers were given a voucher for financial services, they would need to invest in
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costly information-gathering to be able to find an adequate banking product for their needs, and
financial services are notoriously difficult to understand. Since the voucher would pay for exist-
ing services, financial products might not evolve to meet the needs of other low-income
persons. Without the development of new low-cost electronic banking accounts, the vouchers’
worth would be limited to its face value. Moreover, the administrative costs of delivering the
financial services voucher to millions of low-income households are likely to be much higher
than the administrative costs of tracking account opening by a manageable number of financial
institutions who already have established relationships for reporting to the IRS. 
Furthermore, the fact that the subsidy is administered through the tax code, rather than as a
grant program, should not be objectionable. Tax expenditures are not necessarily more or less
efficient than grant programs. The fixed cost of tax administration by the IRS and of tax compli-
ance by corporations is already in place and is unlikely to be affected in any significant way by
the additional tax expenditure. I am proposing that the Treasury Department’s Financial Man-
agement Service (FMS) compute the amount of the tax reduction owed to each financial
institution and administer the program because the FMS already has developed a system for
tracking ETA accounts opened by banks for federal benefit recipients under EFT ‘99. This
aspect of the tax expenditure, which replicates core functions of a grant program, is unlikely to
be significantly different were the financial institutions to be given a grant instead of a tax
credit. 
The alternative to an in-kind program is a direct cash transfer. There are three main critiques
of in-kind transfers compared with cash transfers. First, generally speaking, in-kind subsidies
are thought of as less efficient than cash subsidies because the recipient may only use the in-
kind subsidy for specified purposes. To the extent that the subsidy changes behavior, the
subsidy does not increase the recipient’s welfare to the same degree as if she had received a
cash equivalent to pursue her own preferences. Second, in-kind plans are paternalistic in telling
the heterogeneous recipients that they should derive utility from the particular service. Third,
in-kind programs are often more administratively costly than direct transfers. 
Yet the benefits of this in-kind program are likely to be larger than an equivalent cash trans-
fer. A tax credit is likely to generate “consumption externalities” that benefit society broadly
because the fixed investment leads to a new form of low-cost electronic banking accounts. The
tax credit would establish permanent access to low-cost banking, which would reduce con-
sumers’ costs for cashing checks, facilitate saving, and provide a means to pay bills. 
Pointedly, the argument in favor of income transfers as compared with in-kind subsidies
breaks down when one analyzes how “income” gets transferred. The government does not
transfer income as cash. Income can be transferred as a direct deposit to a bank account, to a
debit or stored value card, or as a check. A check not only costs the government more than an
electronic transfer, but also transfers less value to low-income persons than a direct deposit.
Once established, these accounts permit receipt of other federal or state transfers and private
earnings. 
In addition, a cash transfer would be less efficient than this in-kind program because the tax
credit can screen and target the optimal potential beneficiaries by providing what economists
call an “inferior good,” a good to which a higher-income individual would not immediately be
drawn. In the current market, such a goal would be achieved by offering a product that does not
permit check writing. The divergence in goods provided will differentiate the target audience,
improving the efficiency of the program. 
In sum, the tax credit would be more efficient than a grant program, a demand-side voucher,
or a cash transfer. In addition, enacting a tax credit is more likely to be politically feasible in
today’s environment, than cash assistance. Political feasibility, like other forms of feasibility,
ought to be considered in weighing policy options.
The Community Reinvestment Act
The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) could also help to focus banks and thrifts on oppor-
tunities to provide bank accounts to low-income persons. Under CRA, federal regulators
evaluate bank and thrift performance in serving their communities. As Michael Stegman has
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shown, the CRA service test, under which the regulators evaluate bank and thrift performance
in meeting transaction, savings, and other community needs, has received perfunctory attention
from examiners, with public evaluations containing little or no analysis of whether low-income
consumers actually use bank or thrift products or services.28 Examinations under the service test
could be vastly improved by taking three steps. 
First, examiners should evaluate the extent to which institutions offer low-cost accounts
designed to meet the account needs of low-income individuals. Examiners should attempt to
make a qualitative judgment about the range of product offerings of the institutions, based on
low-income consumer needs, and taking into account the costs to institutions of providing
accounts and the requirements of sound banking practice. 
Second, banks and thrifts should be evaluated based on the number of low-income account
holders at their institution. To reduce the data burden, the banking agencies might consider
permitting institutions to use certain assumptions about their customers’ incomes based on the
accounts offered, whether the account was opened at a branch in a low-income area, or held by
a customer residing in a low-income census tract.
Third, the agencies should give negative consideration to activities that undermine the provi-
sion of quality services to the poor. For example, participation by banks or thrifts in
arrangements with affiliates or other parties that do not provide adequate consumer protection,
or raise compliance, operational, or other risks, such as many payday lending arrangements,
should receive negative consideration as part of the performance context under the service test. 
State Policies and Welfare Reform
States should integrate access to financial services as a core element of welfare-to-work 
strategies. High-cost alternative financial services undermine efforts to improve workforce par-
ticipation by reducing effective take-home pay. Lack of structured savings mechanisms, such 
as direct deposit into a bank account, makes it less likely that new entrants into the workforce
will save against liquidity crises from job loss, injury, or other family emergencies, and makes 
it more likely that such crises will push families back onto the welfare rolls. Moreover, lack of
saving will reduce the ability of low-income families to save for homeownership, skills develop-
ment, or their children’s education.
States should encourage account ownership. First, states should shift EBT to individually
owned accounts. With many contracts now up for renewal, there is a narrow window within
which states could choose to restructure contracts to use EBT to develop banking relationships.
States could move towards providing EBT through individually owned bank accounts and nego-
tiate with networks for surcharge-free alliances for EBT-card holders. In so doing, states would
be increasing the effectiveness of their welfare-to-work strategies by bringing low-income fami-
lies into the banking system in preparation for their entry into the workforce. 
Second, states should permit former welfare recipients to retain accounts after they move
into the workforce. This step may decrease the likelihood that new labor force entrants will turn
to check cashing services once employed and increase the likelihood that they will arrange for
direct deposit of their income. Given the high turnover rates of households on and off welfare,
permitting families to retain EBT-issued bank accounts may be important to those families’
financial stability. Owning a bank account would also enable these working families to access
their tax refunds via direct deposit, reducing their costs for receiving the EITC quickly.
Third, state welfare initiatives should increasingly include Individual Development Account
(IDA) programs, and exempt the full array of IDA programs from state asset limits. As part of
the federal reauthorization of the 1996 Welfare Reform law, Congress should make funds avail-
able to states for these financial services initiatives.
Financial Education
Studies find that financial education can sometimes help to change the financial behavior of
individuals, particularly low-income persons, if such education is combined with institutional
support for the changed behavior. For example, financial education can be combined with new
access to low-cost bank accounts that make financial sense for low-income families, together
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with saving plans at work or in the community. Financial education can focus on better finan-
cial management, reduced reliance on high-cost credit, and increased participation in saving
plans. The Treasury Department could support community-based financial education focused
on account ownership and savings, building on the important work of the Consumer Federation
of America in “America Saves.” In addition, workplace financial education could be funded as
part of tax credits covering the administrative costs of setting up payroll direct deposit and sav-
ings plans for low- and moderate-income workers.
Reforming the Alternative Financial Sector
Bringing low-income households into the banking sector is key to transforming financial serv-
ices for the poor. Still, reform of the alternative financial services sector can help those workers
who, perhaps temporarily, continue to operate, occasionally or permanently, outside the main-
stream banking sector. This section offers proposals for a few key reforms.
1. Check Cashing
Given the high cost structure of a paper- and labor-intensive industry, it is doubtful that costs of
check cashing can be brought down significantly with existing technology. Reduced state regu-
latory barriers to entry, such as geographic restrictions, may help enhance competition—for
example, Wal-Mart’s recent entry into check-cashing—if they are accompanied by consistent
disclosure requirements and enforcement that would make it easier for consumers to shop for
financial services. Some have suggested that banks themselves, with cheaper, direct access to
the payments system, might effectively compete for check-cashing services. It would be cheaper
and the services provided more useful, however, if banks were to compete with check cashers by
offering electronically based banking services, instead of competing with them as check cash-
ers. Advances in direct deposit, debit card infrastructure, and electronic bill payment will also
be required to bring down the costs of income conversion.
2. Payday Lending
The Federal Reserve Board, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Office of
Thrift Supervision have now shut down most bank-payday lender partnerships because of safety
and soundness concerns; the FDIC has not yet followed suit, but should. At a minimum, the
FDIC should use its authority under the Federal Trade Commission Act to take action against
banks and thrifts that are engaged in “unfair and deceptive trade practices” in the course of pay-
day lending activities. Regulators should pay particular attention to the problem of short-term
balloon payments, repeated refinancing, and inadequate or misleading disclosures under the
Truth in Lending Act (TILA). For example, if repeated payday loan rollovers indicate that the
lender failed to underwrite the loan by determining a borrower’s ability to repay, contrary to
safety and soundness guidelines, then the bank may have engaged in an “illegal credit practice”
for purposes of the CRA. Such an illegal practice should adversely affect the bank’s CRA rating.
Congress should also enact legislation mandating that payday lenders report borrowers’ per-
formance to the credit bureaus, so that responsible borrowers have the opportunity to pursue
alternative credit products based on their credit history. 
State regulation of payday lenders has been largely ineffectual to date, at least in part
because payday lenders partnered with federally regulated banks and thrifts that could rely on
federal pre-emption of state usury laws. Moreover, state rollover laws have been largely ineffec-
tive because they can be easily evaded. Thus, some states are now focusing on more effective
legislation that would provide for longer minimum terms for payday lending to reduce the likeli-
hood that short-term balloon loans that are repeatedly refinanced become a “debt trap.”
Over the long term, there is room for greater private sector competition from the banking
industry. Banks could compete with payday lenders by offering alternative, lower cost, longer
term, and lower risk products. In principle, one such alternative might be bank overdraft pro-
tection. Although current disclosures are inadequate and costs are high, in theory overdraft
policies could be provided at lower cost than payday loans because there is no need for face-to-
face interaction. The transactions can take place automatically at low risk and cost to banks.
14 SEPTEMBER 2004 • THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION • RESEARCH BRIEF
“Reform of the
alternative
financial serv-
ices sector can
help those work-
ers who, perhaps
temporarily,
continue to
operate outside
the mainstream
banking sector.”
14
Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 48 [2004]
http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art48
Moreover, repayment of the overdraft could be scheduled so that regular minimum payments
(through automatic debiting of the customer’s account) repay the overdraft over a reasonably
long time period, rather than the current payday loan of two weeks or bank overdraft practice of
thirty days. In addition, the Federal Reserve Board should go further than it did in its recent
overdraft proposal.29 For example, overdraft protection fees should also be disclosed as an exten-
sion of credit using APRs and ATMs should not include overdraft limits as available balances. 
3. Refund Anticipation Lending
The IRS, in responding to congressional pressure to increase e-filing and decrease EITC errors,
has helped to create the market for RALs, by providing tax refund and offset information to pre-
parers, and by delaying EITC refunds to conduct basic anti-fraud and error detection. The IRS
now bears a special responsibility to help end RAL abuse. 
First, and most importantly, Congress should continue to simplify the EITC, for example, by
altering the definition of qualifying children. Simplification should help to drive down costly
error rates, and will help to diminish the need for expensive tax preparation services.
Second, the IRS should expand free tax preparation and electronic filing. Greater availability
of these services would diminish the need to take out RALs in order to pay for preparation serv-
ices. The biggest barriers to an expansion of fee tax preparation services are lack of funds, lack
of sites that provide for electronic filing, and, more critically, lack of effective ways to assure the
quality of these tax preparation services.
Third, since Treasury has now indicated in its FY 2005 budget that the IRS has the technical
capacity to split refunds, the IRS should permit refunds to be direct deposited into more than
one bank account. If refunds are permitted to be split into more than one account, tax prepar-
ers could compete by offering tax preparation services that are paid not out of the proceeds of
RALs, but paid directly to them electronically out of tax refunds through direct deposit to them
of a portion of the refund, diminishing the risk to the preparer and eliminating one reason to
take out a RAL. If this reform is combined with public and private sector efforts to bring EITC
recipients into the banking system, the remaining portion of the refund could be direct
deposited into the client’s own bank account or other saving vehicles. 
Fourth, coupled with better error and fraud detection and prevention efforts, the IRS can
speed up EITC refunds, and do more to encourage direct deposit of refunds into bank
accounts, both directly and through employers, commercial preparers, and Volunteer Income
Tax Assistance (VITA) sites. Only 41 percent of all tax refunds nationwide are direct deposited.
Fifth, EITC recipients can become a central focus of efforts to bank the unbanked. Treasury
should expand its Electronic Transfer Account (ETA) program to permit use of ETAs for tax
refunds that include the EITC. Congress should appropriate more funds for Treasury’s First
Accounts program to support innovative efforts to reach EITC recipients without bank
accounts. The IRS should establish partnerships with large employers to encourage employees
to open bank accounts and establish direct deposit of paychecks and tax refunds. Moreover, the
tax preparation firms themselves—as H&R Block has now begun to do in a recent pilot—should
partner with banks to develop and offer individual, low-cost, electronically based bank accounts
for their clients. Their clients could use the accounts to receive direct deposit of their income
tax refunds, to pay for tax preparation services, to withdraw funds at ATMs and POS using debit
cards, to save as a cushion for financial emergencies, and for their other financial services
needs throughout the year. The tax preparers would gain a new marketing tool and might see
higher rates of client retention.
Sixth, the IRS can use its oversight of e-file preparers to improve the market for EITC recipi-
ents. Towards this end, the IRS should make enforcement a priority; provide more detailed
rules regarding non-deceptive advertising, including disclosures of how the offered product
compares with the IRS’s current anticipated refund times; and force greater transparency in
RAL pricing, including by requiring that RAL funds be provided to EITC recipients in a form
that does not require any additional cost to convert to cash. 
Lastly, if Congress wants the IRS to expand e-filing availability, and direct deposit of refunds,
it should pay for expanding the private sector infrastructure necessary to implement it, rather
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than relying on RAL fees paid by low- and moderate-income tax payers to cover the tax prepar-
ers’ costs of implementing e-filing. Congress could appropriate funds for the purpose, or use an
e-filing tax credit to offset the costs.
Conclusion
L
ow- and moderate-income households who use alternative financial service providers
pay a high price to convert their income into cash, pay their bills, and obtain credit,
and they lack a regular means to save. The high cost of alternative financial services
undermines key income redistribution policies for the poor, including the EITC. Exist-
ing banking products are often not well designed to meet the needs of the poor, and few banks
compete with alternative financial services providers for low-income customers, particularly in
low-income neighborhoods. The cost to individual financial institutions of research, product
development, account administration, staff training, marketing and financial education with
respect to new financial products for the poor, relative to their expected financial return, means
that the market is unlikely to change quickly on its own. In addition, network externalities in
electronic payments systems and distribution networks suggest that net social benefit could be
obtained through further expansion. 
Financial and technological innovation has been a hallmark of U.S. financial markets. 
Financial institutions can harness that innovation to meet the needs of low-income Americans.
Governmental incentives appear to be important to catalyze private sector efforts to use 
financial and technological progress to expand access to financial services for low- and moder-
ate-income families. By helping these families to enter the financial services mainstream, the
policies outlined here can help to transform financial services for low-income persons. Such 
a transformation is a key to promoting greater economic opportunities for low-income house-
holds.
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